It feels like I have the freedom to act. I chose today to sit in front of my computer and type these words. However, freedom cannot survive in a deterministic universe, and physicists tell us that the universe is deterministic. For a while, I have been searching for an answer to how my actions can still be free. Let me know if you have found one, because I didn’t. This time, I read a book, “A Metaphysics for Freedom” by Helen Steward, which contains food for thought but no satisfying answers.

The problem is that of universal determinism. If universal determinism is true, then there is only one possible future. All events have been predetermined from the beginning of time (whatever it means) till the present moment. The author offers an argument against universal determinism based on agency: the future is open if there are self-moving animals. In other words, agency is incompatible with determinism. The author calls her view “agency incompatibilism”.

The agency is manifested in actions: physical actions of a physical body. The process of action is a process of settling things. If I decide I should type the word “settle”, I need to settle 1) whether I should type it; 2) when I start typing it; 3) how my fingers will move when I’m typing, etc. Some things to settle have more options, while some have fewer. The combination of fingers I will use to type the word of six letters is chosen from (potentially) 10^6 options. Whereas to type or not to type is binary. If I indeed settle the matters in such a way, then universal determinism is false.

The author suggests that the majority of animals are agents and settle things about their actions. There seems to be no particular reason to distinguish humans in this regard. Moreover, there seems to be no reason to focus on consciousness in this regard. When I’m typing, some of my actions are controlled by subconscious systems. Also, some animals may have only rudimentary consciousness. However, it doesn’t mean that it is not I who types, and it is not they who move. 

It is also not reasonable to deny that actions have causes. What the author rejects is the idea that an action can have a necessitating cause—a cause that fully determines the action. If the action has a necessitating cause, then the agent would have no genuine alternative, and this action is not free. However, not all movements are actions. According to the author, it’s actions that are “up to us” but not movements.

The distinction is important between movements and voluntary movements. After all, heartbeats are also movements of the body. Clearly, I have poor control over my heartbeat. Over my voluntary movements, I have much more control. I cannot consciously control every fragment of the sequence of movements of my fingers, but I can alter the sequence if needed or refrain from pressing a key altogether.

To settle if my fingers move in a certain way is to be able to give rise to those movements and to be able not to give rise to them. Refraining from acting is also a power to act. After pressing the key “K” on my keyboard, the letter “K” appears on my screen. It doesn’t have a choice. I, on the other hand, may not type if I want.

Be that as it may, I don’t always do what I want to. I want to finish this post, but instead, I may play a game, or scroll, or check if my slurm job is still running. It is not that I always have strong willpower. However, saying that freedom depends on agency only means that I am free only if I have the power to make choices and act on them. It doesn’t mean that choices should always be rational and admirable. Therefore, the possibility of weakness of will is also required for freedom to exist.

The overall proposal of the book is a conception of agency where

- an agent can move its body (or parts)
- an agent is something that acts from its own internal point of view
- an agent is something that can be described as wanting something, trying to do something, or perceiving something
- an agent settles the matter when it comes to certain movements of its body.

The book is written in authentic language, which I truly enjoyed.  Most of the arguments in the book are coherent and understandable.   I like that the author covers agency instead of free will. Free will is usually loaded with the conception of responsibility and morality, while agency is more basic, so to speak. I like that humans are included in the general framework as a part, not as a pinnacle. However, for me, this framework doesn’t seem satisfactory. I agree that I settle some things concerning my actions; it certainly feels like so. But what if all those settling are predetermined, up to the smallest detail? Then the author speculates that there should be some control of the low-level processes by the high-level processes. It seems that it is a crucial matter, but not the topic of the book, so the author only proposes that it should be the case. It would be nice to know what those processes are. It would be nice if I could find a clear strategy for what to look for if I conduct the experiment.

Favourite quote:

“The power of agency is a power to settle, and not necessarily in all instances a power to choose”.

December, 2025